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Chapter 6
Risk Sharing Alternatives for Pension
Plan Design: An Overview and Case Studies
Anna M. Rappaport and Andrew Peterson
Pension plan designs range from those that place virtually all of the risk on
the plan (and plan sponsor) to those that place nearly all of the risk on the
individuals covered by the plan. Traditional deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) plans may
be found at one end of this spectrum, while deﬁned contribution (DC)
plans are at the other. Neither is ideal, so new alternatives are needed to
provide better retirement security on a sustainable and affordable basis.
Fortunately, there is increasing attention being given to new plan types
that increase risk sharing and thus ﬁt more in the middle on the risk sharing
spectrum (Fuerst 2015; Blitzstein 2015). This chapter identiﬁes the various
risks and discusses methods of sharing them, both in traditional DB plans
and in hybrid plan designs. Next we discuss different methods of risk sharing
and provide considerations when adopting them. Two case studies identify
recent developments.
Our focus is on the perspectives of various stakeholder groups, primarily
the plan sponsor (who is often the employer), and the beneﬁt plan partici-
pant or retiree. Other stakeholders include ﬁnancial services companies
and the public at large, who also have an interest in this topic, but these
broader considerations are beyond the scope of the chapter.
Context and Background
The United States retirement system is made up of a combination of Social
Security, employer-sponsored pension plans, personal savings, and (increas-
ingly) continued work during retirement. Employer support for pensions
has shifted over time, from DB plans to DC plan arrangements. The current
system has a number of problems, including the fact that traditional DB plan
costs are perceived to be too volatile. Also, many organizations are either
closing traditional DB plans to new entrants or freezing beneﬁt accruals
for all with the intention of terminating the plan when it is ﬁnancially viable
to do so. These actions indicate that such plans are often viewed as
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unsustainable. Some DB plans are in ﬁnancial trouble and may not be able
to pay the full promised beneﬁts. In addition, some well-funded DB plans
have moved into a state of ﬁnancial trouble because they granted too many
beneﬁt increases and subsidies at early retirement.
Many individuals do not have the motivation, knowledge, or skill to
provide a satisfactory retirement income on their own. Many DC plan
participants will not have adequate beneﬁts at retirement because of con-
tributing too little, using the money too early, or not earning enough
investment income due to overly conservative or poorly timed decisions.
While lifetime income is the most secure way to deliver beneﬁts during
retirement, few DC plan beneﬁts are paid as lifetime income, and many
plans do not offer such an option.
There has been a major shift to DC plans underway for a number of years.
The structure of DC plans has been changing to improve the beneﬁts that
they are delivering and to make them less reliant on individual decisions. At
the same time, experts discussing the pension system have pointed out that
risk pooling is very desirable, and that other options may better serve the
societal need for a well-designed and functional retirement system.
Research Findings
Several recent projects have explored principles for better plan design along
with new approaches to evaluate pension systems. The American Academy
of Actuaries AGES report (2014) looks at four factors necessary for an
effective and strong future pension system. These include alignment, gov-
ernance, efﬁciency, and sustainability. While the report does not directly
propose speciﬁc plan designs, several of the issues it raises are linked to plan
design. Alignment speaks to linking plan management to the capabilities
and needs of each of the stakeholder groups, so as to have the plan work well
for both plan sponsors and participants. It also implies a plan design that
works for participants with long service with a single employer as well as for
those with a series of jobs or with periods in and out of the labor force.
Governance refers to a plan structure that has direction and controls as part
of the overall design. If adjustments are built into expectations for the plan,
the combination of both design and governance is needed to make it work
well. Efﬁciency speaks to grouping smaller plans into larger multiple-entity
arrangements, providing opportunities for retirement asset accumulation
through a working career, minimizing leakage during the payout and accu-
mulation phases, encouraging pooling of risks and appropriate risk sharing,
keeping expenses low, and assisting in narrowing the variability of beneﬁts
by fostering hedging of risks to support guarantees. Efﬁciency lowers costs
and allows more contributions to be used for beneﬁts rather than covering
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plan expenses. Sustainability speaks to intergenerational equity, appropriate
cost allocation among stakeholders, weathering market shocks, and achiev-
ing an appropriate balance between these results while providing adequate
beneﬁts. In addition, self-adjusting systems are proposed as a method of
achieving sustainability.
The Society of Actuaries Retirement 20/20 project served as a precursor
to and background for the Retirement for the AGES project. It brought
together a variety of stakeholders in several forums and collected papers to
identify some of the best ideas internationally for building a pension system
absent current regulatory constraints. Alignment of stakeholder interests,
self-adjusting systems, and risk sharing were among the ideas explored. Six
themes identiﬁed in that project are: (1) systems should consider new
norms for work and retirement and the role of the normative retirement
age; (2) systems should align stakeholders’ roles with their skills; (3) systems
should be designed to self-adjust; (4) systems should be better aligned with
ﬁnancial markets; (5) systems should clarify the role of the employer; and
(6) retirement systems will not succeed without improvements in the health
and long-term care systems (Society of Actuaries 2007). The discussions in
the Retirement 20/20 project point to several ideas that enter the discussion
on risk sharing and plan design: the importance of appropriate retirement
ages, using self-adjusting features, recognizing workplace realities, and
understanding the roles of various stakeholders.
The Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index reviews the operation of
the overall pension system in 20 countries and grades the systems on overall
categories of adequacy, sustainability, and integrity (Mercer 2013). The
ratings include both public beneﬁts (social insurance) and the private
system. The scores are based on responses to questions in each category.
The degree of variation in the responses by country is much greater for
some questions than for others. An individual country may be rated highly
on some questions and poorly on others. Several issues raised in the index
study are important to plan design and risk sharing. The areas for improve-
ment frequently refer to retirement ages and how people retire, including
raising the minimum age for retirement beneﬁts, raising state pension ages,
and improving labor force participation at older ages. There is a wide
variation in ratings, and Denmark is currently the only country rated with
an A grade.
Both the Melbourne Mercer index and the Society of Actuaries Retire-
ment 20/20 project recognize the importance of retirement ages in the
long-term future of retirement systems. The former study asked about time
of retirement in terms of the gap between retirement ages and life expect-
ancy today and in 2035. The low scores for average period of pension
payment today are 7.3 in India and 12.4 in Mexico. The high scores are
19.7 in France and 21.4 in Korea (Mercer 2013). The 2013 index report also
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included a new question to explore phased retirement. In response to
questions about whether employees could receive private plan beneﬁts,
continue working part-time, and continue accruing beneﬁts or contributing
to their plans, six of the twenty countries received a maximum score, six
received a score of zero, and eight were given something in between
(Mercer 2013). Additional demographic questions focused on fertility
rates and expected old age dependency rates in 2035. Another major area
of focus is the method used to pay beneﬁts during retirement, with a focus
on the extent to which lifetime income is used. The discussion of private
plans is heavily focused on DC plans. Noteworthy for this chapter are the
wide variations in systems by country, the importance of sustainability, the
importance of lifetime income payouts, and the recommendation for adjust-
ing retirement ages and options with demographic changes.
Considerations Affecting Plan Design in the Future
When designing a retirement plan, a wide range of risks should be con-
sidered, both pre- and post-retirement. While investment, inﬂation, and
longevity risk are always important, several additional risks are worth noting:
these include employment risk, business risk, and the risk of poor choices.
Some, such as the risk of family change, do not directly impact plan design
and will not be discussed. In Table 6.1, we summarize the list, along with
factors facing plan sponsors and participants in retirement and when they
generally apply—whether in the pre- or post-retirement phase. Failure to
focus on the range of risks when considering alternatives may result in
incorrect conclusions.
In the debate about the future of the United States pension system,
questions arise as to whether these plans should be voluntary or mandatory
and universal. Moreover, a system can be mandatory at the employer level,
but still optional for individual employees. Another area of disagreement is
whether lifetime income should be mandated, or instead strongly encour-
aged for all or some part of retirement assets.
Sustainability, the ability of a retirement system to last through economic
cycles and demographic changes, is critical to the long-term success of the
retirement system (American Academy of Actuaries 2014). What is needed
to maintain sustainability varies with the regulatory climate and method of
accounting used by plan sponsors. The move to more transparency and use
of market values has increased the focus on short-term results. While this
move has not changed the underlying economics of retirement plans, it has
made it more important that there be safety valves enabling pension plan
sponsors to deal with extreme economic conditions. Self-adjusting systems,
to be discussed here, offer examples of safety valves.
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table 6.1 Major risks facing plan sponsors and participants in retirement plans
Risk Deﬁnition Pre- or post-retirement risk
Investment Risk that returns on invested assets
are different from what is expected
Both
Interest rate
risk
Risk of unexpected changes in
interest rates leading to changes in
value of deﬁned plan liabilities,
changes in annuity prices, and to
changes in the interest earnings on
ﬁxed dollar investments and bank
accounts
Both and also at time of retirement
Inﬂation risk Risk resulting from loss of purchasing
power due to unexpected increases in
price levels.
Both
Longevity
risk
Risk resulting from differences in the
level of population mortality and/or
the risk that any particular individual
will live longer (or shorter) than
expected
Primarily post-retirement
Employment
risk
Risk that individual will lose job prior
to retirement or leave and lose future
beneﬁt accruals; also includes risk of
being pushed into retirement earlier
than planned
Pre-retirement
Business risk Risk that business sponsoring plan will
do poorly, impacting jobs, that
employer will decide to change plans,
or be acquired leading to plan change
Primarily pre-retirement, but also
post-retirement if beneﬁts being paid
from plan are not fully funded
Risk of poor
choices
Risk that participant will not make
good choices leading to insufﬁcient
savings and/or a poor plan for using
funds post-retirement
Both and at time of retirement
Fiduciary
risk
Risk that plan sponsors and service
providers don’t meet ﬁduciary
requirements; sponsor may be subject
to penalties if they fail to meet them
As long as funds remain in the plan
Solvency risk Risk that any entity providing beneﬁts
will become insolvent, or unable to
pay beneﬁts and that there will be a
default on all or part of beneﬁt
payments
Both
Public policy
risk
Risk that policy will change or be
enforced in a way that creates adverse
impact
Both
Source : Authors’ analysis.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/12/2015, SPi
Risk Sharing Alternatives for Pension Plan Design 99
The effectiveness of a retirement system for participants depends on
accumulating enough resources for retirement and on using them effect-
ively in retirement. Lump sums are generally an inefﬁcient way of using
resources in retirement, because these eliminate the efﬁciency of risk pool-
ing and place longevity risk on participants. In addition, they provide more
funds to those who die earlier rather than to those who live long. This is an
issue in both DB and DC plans (Mercer 2013; Society of Actuaries 2007).
A discussion of designs for the future and methods of risk sharing needs to
include the post-retirement period. Table 6.1 includes information on when
risks apply and identiﬁes which risks are applicable to the post-retirement
period.
Different Ways to Share Risk
By risk sharing, we mean the distribution of risk between various plan or
system stakeholders. The Society of Actuaries Retirement 20/20 report
identiﬁed four primary stakeholders: society, employers, participants, and
markets (2007). In the present context we slightly expand these categories
to identify stakeholders as employer plan sponsors, participants, ﬁnancial
service companies, policymakers, guarantee organizations, and the public at
large. Risk can also be shared by different groups of plan participants,
between participants and employers, between participants and ﬁnancial
service companies, etc. As laid out in Table 6.2, risk can be shared in
different ways, through plan design or beneﬁt structure, ﬁnancing struc-
tures, self-adjusting systems, pooling, multiple entity arrangements, third
party guarantees, and backup guarantee funds. Next we offer a discussion of
how risk sharing approaches can be used in pension systems, either one at a
time or in combination.
Using plan design to deﬁne risk sharing and allocation
Methods of deﬁning risk sharing and allocation through plan design
include allocating risk directly in the method of determining beneﬁts,
adjusting beneﬁts based on funding level or some other deﬁned trigger
(self-adjusting system), and/or including contingent beneﬁts in the plan.
DB and DC plans allocate risk directly as part of plan design. Traditional
DC plans with lump sum payouts place essentially all risk on plan partici-
pants (although some plans do pool investment risk in the pre-retirement
phase). Variable annuity policies may include a ﬂoor guarantee on invest-
ment returns or on income to be paid out, thereby sharing risk between an
insurance company and the policyholder. These plans put most risk on the
individual but do place some risk on the insurance company. A charge is
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levied for each guarantee purchased. If the variable annuity policies are
used to fund an employer-sponsored plan, the employer may share some of
this risk.
Traditional non-contributory ﬁnal average pay DB plans which do not
offer indexing of beneﬁts after retirement place most risk on the plan
sponsor, but the post-retirement inﬂation risk is held by the participant.
The participant is also at risk in the event of plan sponsor bankruptcy or
failure to provide needed funds to the plan.1 In addition, the participant is
table 6.2 Strategies for managing and sharing risk
Strategy Description Type of sharing Comments
Plan design Deﬁnes beneﬁt and
obligations of parties
Between plan sponsor
and participant
Different types of plan
structures share risk
differently; variations can
moderate risk sharing
Financial
structure
Deﬁnes who pays for
beneﬁts and how cost
shared, and allocated
over time
In contributory plans,
risk shared between plan
sponsor and participant,
risk may also be shared
with third party
In noncontributory
plans, no sharing of
ﬁnancial risk
Self-adjusting
systems
Provisions in plans that
adjust arrangements
based on circumstances
Used to moderate risk
sharing
Can apply to plan design
or ﬁnancial structure
Risk pooling Spreads risk over a
group of participants
and deﬁnes pool
Spreads between
individual participants,
or entities within same
risk pool
Some risks pool well, for
some anti-selection is a
potential problem, and
some do not pool at all
Multi-entity
arrangements
Uses a single plan to
provide beneﬁts to
participants from
multiple entities
May share risks between
entities depending on
type of arrangement
Third party
guarantees
If beneﬁts are insured,
then a third party,
usually an insurance
company, offers a
guarantee
Involves sharing risk with
third party in exchange
for a market price
Backup
guarantee
funds
Governmentally or
industry sponsored
arrangements to provide
backup guarantees;
provide protection for
solvency risk
Shares risk across
pension plans, banks or
insurance companies;
provides protection to
individuals
US examples are the
Pension Beneﬁt
Guaranty Corporation,
the FDIC, and state
insurance guarantee
funds. Other countries
have generally similar
programs.
Source : Authors’ analysis.
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at risk with respect to future beneﬁt accruals.2 This is an important issue
since the beneﬁt accrual pattern in these plans provides for much higher
accruals as the participant nears retirement. These plans involve risk pool-
ing, so that mortality and investment risk are shared within the risk pool.
The plan sponsors bear all risks assigned to these risk pools. In a single
employer plan, one employer bears the risk, whereas in a multiple entity
arrangement, the risks may be shared between entities depending on the
structure of the arrangement. Traditional career average pay pension plans
allocate investment and longevity risk to the plan sponsor, and inﬂation risk,
both pre- and post-retirement, to the participant. The custom for many
organizations that sponsored such plans was to provide for periodic ad
hoc updates to the career average beneﬁt, shifting some of the inﬂation
risk to the plan sponsor. Increases were at the discretion of the plan sponsor,
providing for a different method of risk allocation.
Table 6.3 provides more detail by contrasting how plan sponsors and
participants face risks in the most common types of retirement plans.
Table 6.3 also shows that both groups bear some risk, even in traditional DB
and DC plans. Traditionally, larger employers balanced the risk borne by the
individual and the employer by offering both DB and DC plans. Such com-
binations could be tailored to the needs of the organization and also provide
some balancing between employees of different ages. Traditional ﬁnal aver-
age pay DB plans provided relatively small beneﬁts for those who left the ﬁrm
early in their careers, and much better beneﬁt accruals later, particularly at
the point of approaching unreduced retirement beneﬁts. By contrast, DC
plans provided signiﬁcantly greater retirement beneﬁts for early career par-
ticipants, due to investment income expected to accumulate over the many
years during which the account balances were invested prior to retirement.
Many employers have adopted hybrid plans, and innovative ideas for new
designs are emerging. A recent study on hybrid pension plans identiﬁed a
wide range of hybrid arrangements and a broad range of risks (Turner
2014). The study included both actual arrangements in existence and
proposed new ideas, including types of hybrid plan designs that divide
risks between those that apply to the pre-retirement period versus after
retirement. It also split plans between those that shift risk to participants
in pre-retirement, to participants at retirement, to participants post-
retirement, and to participants both pre- and post-retirement. Hybrids can
be structured to start from a DB design and shift some of the risks to
participants, or to start from a DC design and shift some of the risks to a
third party or plan sponsor. That study also created a pension risk index and
rated several plans with respect to both participant and employer risk.
Risk sharing adjustments built into plan designs may include provisions
such as cost-of-living increases that are temporarily discontinued if funding
levels drop below a threshold; alternatively, cost-of-living additions can be
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table 6.3 Risks assumed by various stakeholders under selected plan designs
Plan type Plan sponsor risks Participant risks Comments
Final
average pay
deﬁned
beneﬁt
In non-contributory
plans, full risk that costs
exceed expected. Risks
include longevity,
investment, interest rate
risk, and pre-retirement
inﬂation risk.
In most plans, post-
retirement inﬂation
risk. Risk that plan will
be modiﬁed or
terminated, or early
employment
termination. In
contributory plans,
participants may share
risks usually borne by
plan sponsor.
Costs reﬂect beneﬁts
already earned and
expected future
beneﬁts. Beneﬁts
already earned are
protected on plan
termination. Risks can
be moderated by adding
provisions to adjust
beneﬁts based on
funding levels.
Career
average pay
deﬁned
beneﬁt
In non-contributory
plans, full risk that costs
exceed expected. Risks
include longevity,
investment, and interest
rate risk.
Inﬂation risk. Risk that
plan will be modiﬁed or
terminated. In
contributory plans,
participants may share
risks usually borne by
plan sponsor.
It is customary in some
plans to provide ad-hoc
updates, covering some
part of the impact of
inﬂation. Risks can be
moderated as
mentioned above.
Cash
balance
In non-contributory
plan, full risk that costs
exceed expected. Risks
include investment,
interest rate risk and
some longevity risk
(depending on
participant choices).
Inﬂation and most
longevity risk. Risk that
plan will be modiﬁed or
terminated. In
contributory plans,
participants may share
risks usually borne by
plan sponsor.
Cash balance plans use
different return indices
subjecting sponsor and
participants to varying
levels of investment risk.
Prevalence of lump sum
decisions impacts
longevity risk.
Deﬁned
contribution
Fiduciary risk if plan not
managed properly. Risk
that employees will be
unable to afford to
retire and create
workforce management
challenges.
Longevity, investment,
and inﬂation risk.
Investments generally
not pooled. Risks can be
reduced by
guaranteeing a ﬂoor
investment return, but
this comes with a price.
Such provisions offered
in variable annuity
contracts.
Collective
deﬁned
contribution
Fiduciary risk if plan not
managed properly. Risk
that employees will be
unable to afford to
retire and there will be
difﬁcult human
resource issues.
Longevity, investment
and inﬂation risk.
Longevity risk may be
pooled depending on
how beneﬁts are paid.
Investment risk may be
shared depending on
plan structure.
This is a deﬁned
contribution plan with
pooled investments.
Some such plans require
annuity payouts.
Note : Some risks discussed in text such as solvency and business risk, and the risk of poor
decisions not included in this analysis.
Source : Authors’ analysis.
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discretionary or contingent on some funding level. This combines beneﬁt
design and ﬁnancing to achieve risk sharing. Other beneﬁt adjustments—
permanent or temporary—can be used when funding levels cross certain
barriers. Some newer designs, such as plans offered in the Netherlands
(Bovenberg et al. 2015) and New Brunswick (Leech and McNish 2013)
offer this type of risk adjustment. If funding levels return to the threshold
levels, beneﬁt adjustments may be temporary.
The participating group annuity plans used from the 1930s to the 1960s
provided that insurance companies could assume most of the risk, while still
sharing some with policyholders. The purchase price included a margin for
adverse experience, and this amount was returned to the policyholder in the
event of good experience. In this way, these plans shared risk between the
insurer and the plan sponsor policyholder. They could also increase beneﬁts
in the event of good experience, and in that situation, the participant also
became part of the risk sharing arrangement.
Using plan ﬁnancing structure to share risk
Plans that include both employee and employer contributions can share risk
through ﬁnancing adjustments, when the plan’s ﬁnancial status inﬂuences
contributions to the plan, beneﬁts levels, or both. This is a form of sharing
risk across stakeholders. If contributions are set as a level percentage of pay,
risk is also shared among the current group of participants, with younger
employees paying more than their current share of the cost in DB plan
arrangements.
Beneﬁts can also be adjusted up or down based on built-in adjustment
rules and/or funded status. Adjusting beneﬁts based on share values or
investment returns, or indexing retirement ages with changes in life expect-
ancy, are examples of such adjustments. Beneﬁts may also be adjusted based
on funded status thresholds. These adjustments share risk across stake-
holder groups and may also share risk within stakeholder groups.
Using self-adjusting systems to manage risk
The studies discussed so far emphasize self-adjusting systems. Self-adjusting
systems refer to programs that include built-in features that respond to
speciﬁed conditions (usually adverse experience) without direct involvement
of the plan sponsor. These adjustments can link to both design and funding
and can be embedded in a variety of risk management strategies, which can
be important when there are shifts in demographic, economic, or business
conditions. For example, participating insurance contracts were an early
form of self-adjusting system. Cost-of-living increases that are contingent on
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the funded status of the plan, and provisions that reduce beneﬁts or increase
contributions based on funded status, are also forms of self-adjustment.
To date, many retirement systems have not responded effectively to
demographic changes (Rappaport 2014). Retirement age increases are
needed to enhance the system sustainability in many countries (Mercer
2013), which can also be an adjustment mechanism, if retirement ages
automatically increase with life expectancy. It will be very helpful to focus
on expanding opportunities for older persons to continue to work and
opportunities to phase into retirement (Mercer 2013).
Using risk pooling
Risks that are most readily poolable are those which members do not control
and cannot predict (such as life expectancy). When members of a risk pool
can control or predict the occurrence of the event being protected, there is
the potential for anti-selection.
In a mandatory system such as Social Security, mortality risks are pooled
across all beneﬁciaries, and beneﬁts are paid for life. Those who live longer
receive beneﬁts longer, while those who die early receive less in lifetime
beneﬁts. The mortality experience reﬂects the entire population. By contrast,
the employer-sponsored DB plan with only an income option pools risk over
the employee population that qualiﬁes for beneﬁts. The mortality experience
reﬂects the types of workers in the plan sponsor organization. For example, a
coal mining company will have very different mortality from a law ﬁrm. The
immediate annuity business of an insurance company pools the mortality risk
of its policyholders. Since healthier people tend to buy annuities, the insurer’s
mortality experience must recognize that this group lives longer than Social
Security beneﬁciaries or all employees. It is possible to set up multiple risk
classiﬁcations and risk pools for annuities to reﬂect these differences in risk
levels. For annuities, this approach is used in both the United Kingdom and in
the United States, though it is more common in the former.
The challenges of setting up a risk sharing arrangement using a risk pool
include achieving a reasonable spread of risk and being able to charge a
reasonable price for the arrangement. When life insurance is sold to indi-
viduals, it is priced according to the age and health status of the purchaser.
Through a process known as underwriting, the risk is evaluated, and people
in poor health may be refused personal life insurance or charged an extra
premium. When life insurance is provided to an employer group, it is priced
according to the demographic and industry characteristics of the group.
The group, rather than the individual, is underwritten.
In a given population at a point in time, a fraction of the pool will be
expected to die within the next year. Because life expectancies are changing
over time, the number of people expected to die in a similar population a
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few years later will usually be different. When life expectancies are increas-
ing, the number of deaths expected at each age will decrease over time. The
terms ‘systemic risk’ and ‘idiosyncratic risk’ are used to understand risk
related to changing mortality rates within the population. Idiosyncratic
risk is the risk that a particular participant will live longer than expected.
Systemic risk is the risk that life expectancy improves by more than
expected for the entire cohort. Systemic risk is not poolable, whereas
idiosyncratic risk is poolable. Pension and annuity plans that offer lifetime
guarantees of income are subject to both types of longevity risk: idiosyn-
cratic longevity risk is managed by pooling, but systemic risk is generally
held to be unhedgeable, since few if any assets are widely available to
hedge it (Turner 2014).
Establishing multiple entity arrangements
Multiple entity arrangements offer a means to share risk across groups of
participants and a way to create larger pools by combining smaller entities.
Employers range in size from single individuals and small employers with
fewer than ten employees, to major organizations with hundreds of thou-
sands or even millions of employees. Large entities are able to achieve
economies of scale, have resources to use strong professional help, and if
they pool risk, create large risk pools. Small entities are able to access a
greater variety of retirement plan options on a much more economical basis
if they can join with a larger entity, provided it ﬁts their needs. Multiple
entity arrangements can offer DC and DB plans, or versions of newer hybrid
plans. The legal structure of the jurisdiction in which they operate governs
the options available to establish such plans. These plans differ in how they
operate and in their resulting success. New types of multiple entity plans may
be needed in the future, particularly if smaller employers are to have access
to retirement plans.
Many United States and Canadian public pensions are multiple entity
plans, covering several different entities. For example, the Illinois Municipal
Retirement Fund (IMRF) covers 175,000 members linked to 2,900 employ-
ers within the state. The system administers a retirement, death, and disabil-
ity plan in Illinois, and it is a DB plan, with contributions shared by
employers and employees. Beneﬁts are guaranteed by the Illinois Constitu-
tion, and municipalities and counties outside of the City of Chicago are
required to participate in the plan. Many other local government entities
can join the plan by choice (IMRF 2012). With this type of plan, a public
plan administrator deals with many different entities and offers a variety of
services. It may offer a single beneﬁt program or multiple programs
from which to choose. The public plans have choices about how they set
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up their operations and which risks they share and how.3 They normally
would have one set of pooled investments for DB plans and one risk pool for
purposes of mortality risk. They also would normally reﬂect entity demo-
graphics in setting contributions. Such public plan systems may be viewed
as offering many of the same services as an insurance company, though
they are not licensed as insurance companies. Public plans can be made
mandatory for the eligible government units by action of the appropriate
legislative body.
The pension operations of many religious denominations are also like
multiple entity plans, again generally without being formally classiﬁed as
insurance companies. They can be similar to some of the public pension
entities, and if the plans are established as church plans in the United States,
they are not subject to the same regulation as private plans. Two examples
are the programs sponsored by the Episcopal and the United Methodist
Churches (Church Pension Group 2014; General Board of Pensions of the
United Methodist Church 2014).
Industry plans are used in the Netherlands (Bovenberg et al. 2015),
unlike in the United States. Some US observers view TIAA-CREF as similar
to an industry plan for higher education (American Academy of Actuaries
2014; Goodman and Richardson 2015). Multi-employer plans within the
United States serve as industry plans within the unionized portion of indus-
tries including trucking and iron work.
US multi-employer plans offer pension beneﬁts to unionized employees,
and they are jointly managed by employees and representatives of the
company (or companies).4 These plans negotiate contributions and pro-
vide beneﬁts deﬁned through a DB formula. Risk is shared across all
participating entities, without any adjustment for differences in demo-
graphics or when the entity entered the plan. When an employer leaves
the plan, it is assessed a withdrawal liability, with the basis of that liability
set by law. Some of these plans have seen a major downward spiral as
employment patterns have changed and particular occupations and/or
industries represented by covered employees declined. For instance, milk
deliverers and milliners are examples of occupations that have virtually
disappeared today. Some of these plans did not work well, because they
were not structured to manage the risk well, particularly in light of demo-
graphic and industry challenges.
Third party guarantees and guarantee funds
Risk can also be shifted to third parties through the purchase of ﬁnancial
instruments such as insurance, with a market price set for the risk transfer.
Risk can also be partly transferred to a backup guarantee fund. State
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insurance pools provide guarantees to back up some insurance contracts.
The US Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) provides guaran-
tees for private sector pension beneﬁts. Bank deposits in the United States
up to certain limits are guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation. In addition, there are various examples of guarantee funds
in other countries, such as the UK’s Pension Protection Fund. Each
government-sponsored guarantee fund has its own method of ﬁnancing.
The existence of such funds changes the risk proﬁle of speciﬁc beneﬁts.
It can also create moral hazard if companies take excessive risks, knowing
they are protected.
Risk Sharing as Applied to Different
Types of Risks
This chapter has deﬁned the risks, general methods of sharing them, and
their allocation to plan sponsors and participants. Table 6.4 offers a more
detailed look by identifying speciﬁc methods of managing investment risk,
interest rate risk, inﬂation risk, and longevity risk. Here we compare risk
management methods available to plan sponsors with those available to
participants, expanding on the ideas presented in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 by
offering a range of methods for risk sharing.
Investment risk
DC plans in the US allocate investment risk to participants who can select
their own investment mix from a menu of choices. The plan administrator is
responsible for structuring the choices and usually there is a default invest-
ment option viewed as suitable for participants who do not make investment
elections. Target date funds that vary the investment allocation according to
the time to retirement are now a common default option in the United
States. This is quite different from individual retirement accounts (IRAs)
where individuals can choose any investment available in the market, and
people can work with a variety of different service providers in establishing
a plan.
Traditional DB plans allocate investment risk and choice to the plan
sponsor. Liability driven investments offer one route to managing invest-
ment risk,5 but this may result in a higher long-term cost, due to giving up
higher expected equity returns. However, under some economic scenarios,
this strategy could result in lower long-term costs.
There are variations in plan design that allocate the risk differently. For
example, cash balance plans with crediting rates based on an economic
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index allocate investment choice and most of the investment risk to the
employer, but they then share investment risk somewhat with plan partici-
pants depending on the index used for crediting investment returns and the
method of linking actual fund investments to the interest credited to par-
ticipant accounts. Variable annuity contracts with ﬂoor guarantees share
risk between policyholders and ﬁnancial institutions. The policyholder
may be able to choose between funds but cannot choose individual invest-
ments. Collective DC plans such as those used in the Netherlands have a
common investment fund and share investment risk across the group of
plan participants.
table 6.4 Summary of methods for managing key selected risks
Risk Plan sponsor risk management Participant risk management
Investment Move from deﬁned beneﬁt to deﬁned
contribution plan
Use liability-driven investments
Manage investment mix, diversiﬁcation,
use of investment managers, choice of
investment vehicles
Transfer to insurance company
Transfer to ﬁnancial institution
Manage investment mix and
Investments
Use advice
Note: When lump sum paid at
retirement, totally up to participant
after that
Interest
rate risk
Use liability-driven investment strategy
Offer gradual purchase of annuity income
over time
Move to deﬁned contribution plans
Pay out lump sums
Use account based deﬁned beneﬁt plan
that credits interest to accounts based on
an index
If purchasing annuity, do so
gradually over time
Consider risk in choice of
investments
Inﬂation
risk
Use plan design to allocate risk between
plan sponsor and employee
Invest in assets that help manage this risk
Note: Beneﬁts can be indexed or partly
indexed: indexation changes the amount
of risk management needed
Save more
Use inﬂation indexed bonds
Purchase annuity including
inﬂation indexing
Longevity
risk
Move to deﬁned contribution plans
Pay out lump sums
Index retirement ages
Adjust beneﬁts for longer life spans
Choose assumptions for deﬁned beneﬁt
plan valuation that build in enough
mortality improvement
Use ﬁnancial instruments to manage
this risk
Use of lifetime income payout
Spend only investment income
Select withdrawal rate that is hoped
to be safe—only partially manages
risk
Retire later
Set long planning horizon
Source : Authors’ analysis.
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Interest rate risk
Interest rate risk leads to changes in the value of deﬁned plan liabilities, as
well as changes in annuity prices. Current interest rates are also a major
factor in immediate annuity prices as well as for returns on ﬁxed dollar
investments which may be an important component of retirement plan
investments. Interest rates have been very low for the last several years;
some argue they are artiﬁcially low due to government intervention. This
has made immediate annuities and bonds more expensive and resulted in
increasing DB obligations.
Inﬂation risk
Inﬂation risk includes both pre- and post-retirement inﬂation risk. Inﬂation
is a very important risk in funded retirement arrangements, whether DB,
DC, or hybrid. Plans that use a ﬁnal average earnings formula implicitly
provide some coverage for pre-retirement inﬂation and place that risk on
the plan sponsor; the latter have declined in prominence.
Most public employee plans, UK pensions, and the US Social Security
system offer beneﬁts indexed for inﬂation during the payout period. Private
US plans rarely include such provisions, so inﬂation erodes the value of
beneﬁts. When beneﬁts are indexed, all or part of the inﬂation risk rests with
the plan sponsor. Inﬂation is often a consideration in setting investment
mix. Other than inﬂation-indexed bonds, however, no investments offer a
direct hedge against inﬂation.
Longevity risk
Plan sponsors can manage idiosyncratic mortality risk through pooling.
Systemic risk is addressed in DB plans through the choice of actuarial
valuation assumptions. The issue is resolved when mortality improvements
adequate to match experience are built into the valuation. Longevity risk
can also be addressed by adjusting beneﬁts or retirement ages if longevity
changes more or less than expected. The Swedish notional DC plan adjusts
beneﬁts for changes in life expectancy as of age 65 (Turner 2014).
One way to address systemic longevity would be to increase retirement
ages on an indexed basis. In the United States and Canada, there has been a
gradual increase in retirement ages in the last few years, but lifespans have
increased far more. An expert commission in Quebec summarized the
impact of changes in work life and life expectancy (Rappaport 2014). In
1970, expected work life was 46 years, and expected retirement was 13 years.
By 2009, expected work life was 39 years, and expected periods of retirement
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were 23 years. The ten-year increase in periods of retirement is the result of
a ﬁve-year increase in life expectancy and a ﬁve-year decrease in expected
retirement ages (Rappaport 2014). The situation is further complicated
because longevity and longevity improvement vary by economic status,
occupation, and education. Long periods of retirement are creating a
major challenge with regard to the sustainability of employee beneﬁt and
social beneﬁt programs. The differences in longevity by economic status and
occupation create equity concerns when there are discussions of raising or
indexing retirement ages.
Business and employment risk
As noted above, ﬁnal average pay plans concentrate much of the beneﬁt
accrual in the later years of employment. Accordingly, employees who leave
their jobs early give up larger beneﬁt accruals. There is also the concern that
their employer may freeze or terminate the plan, or change the plan
structure. In either case, the participant loses out on future beneﬁt accruals.
Employees are also subject to employment risk in the event of job loss, or
business risk in the event the business does poorly, impacting employment
prospects, salary increases, and maybe the future of the pension plan.
When the beneﬁts are provided through DC plans, there is much less
business risk to the employee. DC plans usually vest quickly, and most often,
accruals earned in early years of employment are high relative to what is
earned later. However, if accounts are invested in company stock, this poses
a potentially signiﬁcant business risk for participants. There is also business
risk for the employer in that employees may not have adequate funds to
retire. This can be troublesome to the business for workforce management
reasons.
Risk of poor choices
DC plans typically allow for more individual choices than do DB plans. Non-
contributory private sector DB plans may not require any choices until
beneﬁts are paid. By contrast, DC plans require choices about how much
to save and how to invest those funds. At the point of retirement, these plans
require choices about how beneﬁts will be paid, and some of these choices
may be irrevocable. Increasingly, many US plans use default options such as
auto-enrollment and auto-escalation to minimize the impact of poor
choices, including using one’s assets too early or taking them as a lump
sum distribution and using a portion for immediate consumption. Interest-
ingly, there is a recent challenge with regard to participant choice: some
plan sponsors have offered pensioners a lump sum buyout as part of a
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corporate derisking strategy. This creates a challenging ﬁnancial decision
that some older participants may not be well equipped to make.
Fiduciary and litigation risk
Plan sponsors in the US are subject to ﬁduciary requirements designed to
protect participants against mismanagement, conﬂicts of interest, and
fraud. Fiduciary risk refers to the risk that a sponsor fails to fulﬁll his
requirements and can then be held responsible. For instance, the DC plan
sponsor takes on ﬁduciary responsibility for choosing the investment
options offered in private DC plans. The best defense is a demonstration
that a prudent process was used to select and monitor the investment
options in the fund. This responsibility helps explain plan sponsor reluc-
tance to include annuity income payouts in their plans.
Solvency risk
Solvency risk refers to the risk that an entity providing beneﬁts will become
insolvent or unable to pay beneﬁts, resulting in a default on beneﬁt pay-
ments. In DB plans, the employer or plan sponsor is responsible for plan
funding. Private pensions in the United States have beneﬁts insured by the
PBGC up to speciﬁed limits in the event of bankruptcy, but participants bear
risk when promised beneﬁts exceed the PBGC limits. Participants also bear
the risk of insolvency in situations where there are no backup guarantee
funds, as in the public sector. There is also some risk that a backup guaran-
tee fund could have solvency problems.
Public pension plans have traditionally been seen as not subject to solv-
ency risk, since public entities usually do not go bankrupt. Moreover, public
plan beneﬁts are often protected by state constitutions. This view has
recently been called into question by the bankruptcy of the city of Detroit,
Michigan. A federal judge recently held that Detroit’s obligations to pay
pensions were not protected in a federal Chapter 9 bankruptcy, even though
they were expressly protected by the Michigan Constitution (Davey et al.
2013). The December 2013 Detroit ruling is expected to be further chal-
lenged in the courts, but it opens up the question of whether and in what
circumstances pension beneﬁt protection provided by state constitutions
will prevail.
In DC plans, individual participants bear most of the solvency risk if the
ﬁnancial institution or particular investment funds become insolvent. Vari-
ous kinds of ﬁnancial institutions have some funds guaranteed by a backup
fund. For example, United States insurance companies and banks are part
of guarantee arrangements, but these are subject to limits. Moreover, these
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guarantee funds do not protect against poor investment results, but rather
the bankruptcy of the institution offering the ﬁnancial product. US employ-
ers or plan sponsors have ﬁduciary responsibility for determining the invest-
ment options in private plans.
Case Study: Pension Reform in New Brunswick
In 2012, the Canadian province of New Brunswick adopted a new plan
framework called the Shared Risk Pension Plan. The framework included:
(1) a new design that split beneﬁts between a base beneﬁt and ancillary
beneﬁts; (2) protocols to keep the plan’s operation on track; and (3) a new
risk management regulatory framework to ensure compliance with the
program (Munnell and Sass 2013). This new design is available to public
and private pensions, and it may be used for conversion of existing
pension plans or establishment of new plans (Financial and Consumer
Services Commission 2012). The program was developed by a government
appointed Task Force who recommended that each public sector plan
in New Brunswick be converted to the new plan (Government of New
Brunswick 2013). At the time it was announced, it was supported by a
number of public and private sector pension plans and by unions represent-
ing more than one-third of provincial government bargaining employees.6
As of late 2012, the City of Saint John and Co-op Atlantic ﬁled for approval
of shared risk plans (Government of New Brunswick 2013), and in 2014, the
Shared Risk Plan model was either adopted or announced for adoption by
several Canadian DB pension plans.7
The principles for reforming New Brunswick pensions were set forth by
the Task Force designing the reform (Government of New Brunswick 2013).
As shown in Table 6.5, these seek to balance sustainability and risk pooling.
They speak to plan design, transparency, ﬁnancing, results measurement,
and governance.8
The New Brunswick model weaves together plan design and plan ﬁnan-
cing. Funding levels can trigger beneﬁt adjustments, either up or down. The
traditional method used for DB pension funding uses best estimate assump-
tions, implying a 50 percent probability that contributions will not need to
be increased. The risk sharing model provides for more stringent funding
along with a speciﬁc method of adjusting beneﬁts. If the funding level drops
too low, beneﬁts can be reduced or put on hold. If the funding increases
beyond a certain point, beneﬁts put on hold can be restored. ‘Base’ beneﬁts
are strongly supported, using a standard of success of at least 97.5 percent
likelihood that adequate funding will be maintained without adjustment of
beneﬁts over a twenty-year modeling horizon. ‘Extra’ beneﬁts, such as cost-
of-living increases or early retirement provisions, are considered ancillary
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beneﬁts, and these are also supported using a target contribution sufﬁcient
to fund 75 percent of these beneﬁts on average over a twenty-year time
horizon (Government of New Brunswick 2013). In rare and unforeseen
circumstances, base beneﬁts might need to be reduced; in such a case, the
reduction will be borne by all plan beneﬁciaries including active employees,
deferred vested employees, and retirees. This differs from the traditional DB
approach where beneﬁts were protected ﬁrst for retirees and deferred
vested participants, and where reductions generally applied ﬁrst to future
accruals, and then to those who had not reached retirement age.
In the Shared Risk model, the plan sponsor can offer a plan that pools risk
for plan sponsors and taxpayers. In the conversions seen to date, this plan
design has replaced prior ﬁnal average pay DB plan beneﬁts with career
average pay beneﬁts (although the legislation does not require use of a
career average formula). Also, cost-of-living indexing has been replaced by
contingent indexing, meaning indexing is contingent on funding levels.
Final average pay accruals are frozen at the time of conversion. Contribu-
tions are shared and increased as needed based on ﬁnancial results
(Government of New Brunswick 2013). The legislation enabling these
plans limits contribution changes to 2 percent of payroll and to 25 percent
table 6.5 Principles for reformed New Brunswick pensions
Principle
1. Pension plans must be subject to robust risk management, including annual review and
stress tests to ensure compliance.
2. Pension plan must provide beneﬁt security, which includes risk management targets
focused on a high level of beneﬁt security and governance by an independent trustee.
3. Plan must be able to demonstrate sustainability.
4. Plan must be affordable, which means that contributions must be stable and affordable
for both employer and employees.
5. Plan must be equitability designed—no single age cohort should unduly subsidize
another, and no one should be able to ‘game’ the system.
6. The planmust be transparent. Who shares in the risks and rewards and by howmuchmust
be clear and pre-established.
7. Beneﬁt changes as a result of conversion will apply only in the future; everyone keeps the
pension amount that has already been credited.
8. There should be no sudden shocks to members and retirees’ retirement plans.
9. All groups of employees should be treated consistently including part-time employees.
10. At inception, the actuarial assumptions must be closely related to market benchmarks
such as International Accounting Standard #19.
Notes : Language simpliﬁed and adapted. Item 10 was not included in legislation as ultimately
adopted. It has been observed that Item 7 led to some participant confusion, and that there may
also be some confusion about what beneﬁt has already been earned and what beneﬁt will be
earned in the future.
Source : Government of New Brunswick (2013): 8, 9.
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of the initial contribution level, intended to keep the plans affordable and
sustainable. It is expected that the shared risk structure will encourage
employees to work longer, leading to retirement at older ages. One report
indicates that the targeted retirement year will rise three to four years for
early career employees (Government of New Brunswick 2013).
It is worth noting that the legal structure governing these plans differs
from US pension requirements.9 Speciﬁcally, the Canadian plan must be
operated by independent trustees operating at arm’s length from the
employer. Trustees are required to have an annual actuarial valuation, a
risk management structure, and an investment policy. The plan framework
sets requirements for a funding policy and measurement of plan liabilities,
and actuarial liabilities are to be ‘prudently valued.’10 Funding policy must
be established so that, in normal times, the plan’s ﬁnancial position is
adequate to grant indexing and other ancillary beneﬁts. For plans with
contingent indexing, the funding policy must explain when contingent
indexing starts and stops, and at what levels contingent payments are to be
made. The funding policy also must include an explicit deﬁcit recovery plan.
Provincial legislation allows for the Superintendent of Pensions to establish
guidance with regard to a minimum standard to address underfunding
(Government of New Brunswick 2013). In conversions to date, it has been
common to use a funding methodology that includes an open group funded
ratio of 110 to 120 percent to be achieved over 15 years. However, a plan can
start at a different point if it passes risk management tests in the statute.11
The Canadian Shared Risk Pension Plan was possible because former
Premier David Alward established an expert Task Force in 2010
(Government of New Brunswick 2013). Also, provincial demographics
made pension reform quite urgent: its population is older than the rest of
Canada, with nearly 20 percent of residents over age 65 (Leech and McNish
2013). In the last decade, private sector companies in New Brunswick,
including the St Anne-Nackawic Pulp Company and Fraser Paper, had
gone bankrupt with inadequate funds in their DB pension plans, leading
to beneﬁt losses by both active workers and retirees (Leech and McNish
2013). At the time of the St Anne-Nackawic Pulp Company bankruptcy, the
law provided that assets must be used ﬁrst to cover retirees, terminated
employees, and employees age 55 and over. In 2005, the law was amended
so that beneﬁt losses were shared between retirees and active employees.
Both participant groups lost beneﬁts in multiple bankruptcies, driving the
interest in reform (Leech and McNish 2013).
The government task force found major problems in the funding levels of
both private and public sector plans. Of the existing DB plans registered in
New Brunswick, only a few were fully funded (Leech and McNish 2013). The
City of Saint John faced a pension deﬁcit of C$130 million, an amount nearly
equal to its 2011 revenue of C$138 million. These problems had arisen due
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to a history of inadequate funding, poor economic conditions, demograph-
ics, and extra beneﬁts to induce early retirement (Leech and McNish 2013).
A climate for change resulted from the expert Task Force, as well as a
great deal of communication and a high level of commitment from various
stakeholders. Paul McCrossan, the actuary on the Task Force, stressed that
solutions could be found provided that all parties made sacriﬁces. The Task
Force negotiated with several key labor leaders, so that when the Premier
introduced the proposed pension reforms and the Task Force report to the
public, key labor leaders were at his side and part of the presentation (Leech
and McNish 2013). Many of the ideas used in reform in New Brunswick had
also been used in the Netherlands (Bovenberg et al. 2015).
Case Study: A Different Type of Deﬁned
Contribution Plan
An alternative new model for corporate pensions is the Savings InSight™
plan offered by Buck Consultants and implemented in 2014 (Buck
Consultants 2014). This plan is a DC plan designed to meet the needs of
different groups of participants: those who prefer to have the plan sponsor
do it for them, those who want guidance and shared responsibility, and
those who wish to do it themselves. It includes auto-enrollment and auto-
increases, and a modeling tool to enable participants to modify their deci-
sions and customize them.
The plan design enables the employers to structure beneﬁts so they ﬁt
into the ﬁrm’s human resources needs. A plan sponsor participates in
setting plan parameters for the target retirement age, payout period, deﬁn-
ition of ‘living standards,’ investments, and salary increases. These param-
eters inﬂuence participants’ recommended contributions and increase the
potential for an adequate retirement income payable at the selected target
retirement age. They also communicate an expected retirement age to the
individual participant. These plan features also offer an attractive workforce
management tool, compared to traditional DC plans.
Recommended contributions vary by individual, but they are usually
much higher than default contribution rates typically used for auto-
enrollment in DC plans (Xerox 2013; Buck Consultants 2014).12 Contribu-
tions are tailored to each individual based on his own data.13 Unlike many
retirement calculators, this plan uses actual participant records to produce
an automated calculation customized to personal situations and account
balances. It has been structured to produce an ‘adequate’ retirement bene-
ﬁt for those participants who do not take action. In this way, the plan is
similar to a conventional target beneﬁt approach.14
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The recommended contribution is a ‘nudge’ or suggestion. In addition to
this recommendation, the modeling tool also ‘nudges’ participants who use
it by showing how different decisions can alter retirement income streams.
This structure goes beyond DB plans, in that it gives those participants who
seek choices the chance to make their own decisions. Contribution percent-
ages are also recalculated annually, and if there is a recommended increase,
an automatic contribution increase is implemented. A participant can
always opt out or modify the amounts. The modeling tool can also be used
to evaluate alternatives. If the initial contribution or the recommended
increase is too large, the tool can offer a transition program. In this plan,
the default auto-investment is a target date fund, the Qualiﬁed Default
Investment Alternative (QDIA). The plan uses the assumed rate of return
for the QDIA, but the participant may select whatever investments he wishes.
If a participant invests in funds that do not perform as well as the QDIA
assumptions, his contribution rate is then recalculated to make up for the
lost earnings.15
The beneﬁt default is an installment payout for the number of years
selected by the plan sponsor, with automatic adjustments as may be needed
to maintain the targeted payout. The individual assumes his longevity and
investment risk, but the payments are structured to reduce the chance that
his fund will run out of money. The payment is calculated so that there is a
notional side fund or buffer, to help cover market ﬂuctuations. Good
investment performance increases the side fund, and poor performance
reduces it. The program sends monthly retiree beneﬁt checks, and adjust-
ments are made, as needed, to increase the probability that the payments
will continue over the target payout period. Retirees retain full access to
their funds, and they may withdraw more than the retiree check (but not
less). This is reﬂected in the year-end gain/loss. Additional adjustments
would likely be required to meet US regulatory requirements.
Examples of Recent Developments
New Brunswick offers an example of a new DB structure integrating design,
funding, and plan management, while the Savings InSight™ plan is a DC
plan modiﬁed to produce many of the beneﬁt delivery and human
resources aspects of DB plans (although it lacks an income guarantee).
Numerous other plan sponsors have also made changes to modify risk
sharing. In the US, for instance, some employers have frozen or terminated
DB plans and moved into DC plans. This has primarily resulted in risk
shifting rather than risk sharing. A smaller number of private sector employ-
ers has moved to cash balance plans.
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The US public sector has also made many changes to modify risk sharing
and improve DB plan sustainability. For instance, the National Association
of State Retirement Administrators (NASRA 2014) documents recent
changes to restore or improve sustainability in 56 statewide public plans.
These changes have included increases in employee contributions and the
method of determining them, changes in cost-of-living increases, increases
in retirement ages, and changes in primary beneﬁt formulas. Some provi-
sions explicitly link to the plan’s funded status. For example, in 2010, the
Minnesota Teachers suspended their cost-of-living increase for existing
retirees for two years, and they then reduced the cost-of-living increase
from 2.5 percent per year to 2.0 percent per year until the plan funding
ratio rose to 90 percent. The Montana Public Employees Retirement Asso-
ciation (PERA) in 2013 reduced its cost-of-living adjustment to 1.5 percent
for all current and future retirees, as long as the system was less than 90
percent funded. The cost-of-living adjustment will be reduced 0.1 percent
for each 2 percent below a 90 percent funding level (NASRA 2014). NASRA
(2013) also reports a new focus on hybrid plans in the public sector, since
some employers have found that closing their traditional pension plans to
future employees does not meet important retirement security, human
resource, and ﬁscal objectives.
Findings
To make future retirement plans more effective for risk protection, it will
be useful to develop new arrangements which pool some risk and pro-
vide for different risk sharing. The two case studies described here offer
some insights. Other approaches include modiﬁcations of traditional
plans, generally called hybrids, which assign various risks to either the
plan sponsor or participants in the plan design. The new DC-based
hybrid, already described, does include ongoing adjustments to both
contributions and beneﬁt payments as part of the default options built
into the plan.
Conclusion
In sum, we show that it is feasible to offer a retirement plan that pools risk
and is efﬁcient, but which also limits the sponsor’s downside in adverse
conditions. A relatively easy way to do this is to use a plan design that shares
risk and offers some self-adjusting features. The risk sharing mechanisms
discussed here could also, in theory, be added to most DB plan designs. For
instance, the de-risking effort could move ﬁnal average pay DB plans to a
career average pay design with self-adjusting features and added beneﬁts
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contingent on ﬁnancial results. The de-risking could include recognition of
increasing longevity through self-adjusting increases in retirement ages or
self-adjusting reductions in beneﬁt levels. DB plans could be structured to
respond to future increases in longevity. It is likewise feasible to enhance DC
plans so they include self-adjusting features and offer much better retire-
ment security. Designs can be ﬂexible to meet individual needs while also
reﬂecting diverse organizational needs. A key item on the future retirement
policy agendas is to pursue policy changes that will support desirable plan
designs including optimal risk sharing.
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Endnotes
1. This risk is reduced to the extent plans are insured by a guarantee fund. For
example, beneﬁts provided by private sector plans in the US are insured up to
speciﬁed limits by the Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation. Such funds also
exist in other locations such as Ontario, Great Britain, Japan, etc.
2. This statement about future accruals applies to private sector plans in the US. The
situation is much more mixed with respect to public sector plans. Some have
future accruals protected and others do not.
3. Public pension plans are normally set up by local or state legislation. The choices
open to the plans depend on the legislation. The regulation is very different from
private sector plans in the US.
4. In the US, a ‘multi-employer’ plan is a speciﬁc type of plan authorized under
federal law. These plans have joint union-management governance, and are
subject to different requirements with regard to plan termination and Pension
Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation premiums. They are a subset of the broader class of
multiple entity arrangements.
5. Liability-driven investments are investments structured so that the term of the
investments matches or is closely linked to the duration of the expected payments
from the plan. Liability-driven investments reduce investment risk considerably.
6. Unions supporting the plan when it was announced included the New Brunswick
Nurses Union, the New Brunswick Union, the Canadian Union of Public Employ-
ees (CUPE) Local 1212 (New Brunswick Council of Hospital Unions), and New
Brunswick Pipe Trades, and it had been announced that these unions would be
adopting the new model for speciﬁc plans (Government of New Brunswick 2013).
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7. Information on the New Brunswick plan is taken from government reports as
indicated in the references and supplemented by an interview with Paul Lai Fatt
from Morneau Sobeco, an actuary who is actively involved in working with plans
in New Brunswick.
8. The principles as shown in Table 6.5 are from the reference cited. The authors
have learned from discussion with an actuary working in New Brunswick that
Principle 10 was not included in the legislation as ﬁnally passed, and that
Principle 7 has proved to be difﬁcult in operation. Plan members have found it
difﬁcult to understand what is guaranteed and what is not. It was also pointed out
that while accrued beneﬁts are preserved on conversion, there are some improb-
able circumstances where they would be reduced.
9. Private pension plans in the US are subject to the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) which sets forth detailed requirements for funding and
plan governance. There is no similar requirement applicable to public plans in
the US, and there is wide variation in practice and requirements by state. The
New Brunswick model authorized by legislation effective July 1, 2012 uses very
different requirements. Regulations were issued in Aug. 2012 effective July 1,
2012 (Financial and Consumer Services Commission 2012). The prompt issu-
ance of regulations is also very different from the US.
10. The Task Force report on the design indicated a discount rate close to 4.5
percent based on market conditions in mid-2013 when the report was issued,
as well as mortality tables that include current best estimates of mortality
improvement (Government of New Brunswick 2013).
11. Actuarial valuations can use either a closed group or an open group. Funding
valuations for most plans are closed group, whereas open group valuations are
commonly used to plan beneﬁt and other changes. The closed group approach
focuses on the currently covered population group for a pension plan, including
active participants and participants currently receiving a beneﬁt or due to
receive a beneﬁt in the future. A closed group projection requires demographic
assumptions about how current participants are expected to withdraw, retire,
become disabled and die. The open group approach includes not only the
currently covered population group for a pension plan (as deﬁned in closed
group), but also including future anticipated new entrants (i.e. new employees)
to a system. In addition to the demographic assumptions required for a closed group
projection, an open group projection requires assumptions about the age, service,
and salary proﬁle of new entrants and whether an employee population is
expected to grow, stay in a steady state, or decline. The open group funded
ratio is the assets plus the present value of the next 15 years of excess contribu-
tions (employee contributions plus employer contributions less normal cost), all
divided by the liability of the base beneﬁt.
12. The information on the Savings Insight™ program was provided partly from
literature from the ﬁrm as indicated in the references and supplemented by an
interview with Ted Goldman, National Retirement Leader at Buck Consultants.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/12/2015, SPi
120 Reimagining Pensions
13. Adequate is deﬁned by each company adopting the plan, and the plan sponsor
has choices in that regard.
14. A target beneﬁt plan is a DC plan that uses an underlying formula to deﬁne a
speciﬁed retirement beneﬁt. It then calculates a recommended contribution to
the plan that is expected to accumulate sufﬁcient funds, using an assumed rate of
investment earnings, to provide the targeted beneﬁt at retirement. In such a
plan a different contribution rate is calculated for each employee reﬂecting that
employee’s demographics, salary, and current account balance.
15. QDIA is Qualiﬁed Default Investment Alternative. Under US federal regulations,
these investment alternatives are permitted for default options in deﬁned con-
tribution plans governed by ERISA.
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